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The closely intertwined notions of territory, identity, and authority are at the heart
of conﬂict dynamics in the eastern DR Congo. Focusing on the territorial
aspirations of the Banyamulenge community in South Kivu, this article looks at
the ways in which the nexus of territory, identity, and authority shapes and is
shaped by armed mobilisation. Excluded from a customary chiefdom in the
colonial era, the Banyamulenge, a community framed as ‘migrants’, have been
striving for a territory of their own for decades. These aspirations have fed into
armed activity by both Banyamulenge and Mai-Mai groups linked to opposing
communities, providing deeply resonating mobilising narratives that are
employed to justify violent action. Yet, as this article demonstrates, the links
between armed mobilisation and the nexus of territory, identity, and authority
are both contingent and reciprocal, as violent conﬂict also impacts the meanings
and boundaries of identities, authority structures and territory.
Keywords: conﬂict dynamics; armed mobilisation; eastern DR Congo; territory;
ethnicity; local authority
In September 1999, the rebel administration of the Rassemblement congolais pour la
démocratie (RCD), which at that time held control over large parts of the eastern
DR Congo, created a new administrative entity in the mountainous Hauts Plateaux
area, located at the intersection of the territoires (territories) of Uvira, Fizi, and
Mwenga in the province of South Kivu. The boundaries of this new territory
largely followed the traditional living area of a Tutsi people known as ‘Banyamu-
lenge’, the majority of whom hadmigrated to the region in the nineteenth century. For-
merly subjected to the customary leadership and political authority of other ‘ethnic
communities’,1 the creation of what was called the ‘territoire (territory) of Minembwe’
responded to a long-standing wish of the Banyamulenge to participate in local govern-
ment, which would conﬁrm their status as Congolese citizens. Since the territory was
however carved out of what other communities considered to be their ancestral lands,
its creation provoked ﬁerce resistance. For these self-styled ‘autochthonous’ groups,
the Banyamulenge were recent Rwandan immigrants who tried to usurp Congolese
citizenship by appropriating their lands by force. In this manner, resistance against
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the newly created territory came to feed into the wider struggle that the armed groups
drawn from these communities, commonly known as ‘Mai-Mai’, were waging against
the RCD rebellion, seen as a Tutsi-led ‘foreign invasion’. Thus, from the very moment
of its creation, Minembwe territory was a key source of inspiration for armed group
activity. Strikingly, after the suppression of the territory in 2007, when the war
between the RCD and the Congolese government had formally ended, it remained
an important trigger for armed struggle. New Banyamulenge armed factions appeared
who presented the resurrection of Minembwe territory as one of their main political
claims. This provided fertile ground to violent entrepreneurs from other communities
for stirring up agitation against this territorial claim, which would justify continued
armed struggle.
This article aims to explain why the Banyamulenge’s territorial aspirations have
been so heavily contested and how these contestations have shaped and been shaped
by armed mobilisation. It locates the contentious nature and strong mobilising
power of these aspirations in the particular ways in which territory, identity, and auth-
ority have become intertwined in the Kivu provinces as a result of political and socio-
economic processes in both the colonial and post-colonial era. However, as the article
demonstrates, the links between on the one hand, the nexus of territory, identity, and
authority, and on the other hand, armed mobilisation, are complex and contingent.
Although the forms of belonging connected to territory as both a political and an idea-
tional space are primarily deﬁned in ethnic terms, Minembwe territory also became a
source of conﬂict within the Banyamulenge community. Moreover, those taking up
arms were not uniquely or straightforwardly driven by conﬂictual forms of ethnic
identiﬁcation and related struggles around territory and authority: rather, armed
mobilisation was the outcome of an intricate mixture of factors, including personal
ambitions, clan politics, political and economic elite interests, regional and national
positioning, and divergent political visions. Thus, rather than being a direct cause of
armed mobilisation, Minembwe territory served mostly as a mobilising narrative
centred around conﬂicts related to territory, authority, and identity, which had to
rally support for and justify violent action. Furthermore, the article shows that the
links between the territory, identity, authority nexus and armed mobilisation are not
unilateral, but reciprocal. While this nexus generates the conﬂicts that violent entrepre-
neurs draw upon to mobilise for armed struggle, violent conﬂict again strongly
impacts forms of identiﬁcation, the exercise of authority, and the meanings and some-
times boundaries of territories. This highlights that the notions of territory, identity,
and authority are not ossiﬁed, but constantly evolve, which contributes to their varie-
gated and contingent effects on armed mobilisation.
The article is structured as follows. After analysing the historical roots of the inter-
linkages between territory, identity, and authority in the Kivus, which explain the
strong political and emotional stakes surrounding territory, we elucidate the early
history of the Banyamulenge, and how they came to be denied a territory of their
own. We then trace the evolution of the Banyamulenge’s territorial claims in the
post-colonial era, which crystallised at ﬁrst around the groupement of Bijombo. In par-
ticular, we look at the ways in which political emancipation went on a par with politi-
cal exclusion and discrimination, and how this increased the attractiveness of a
recourse to rebellion to advance territorial claims, as manifested during the First
(1996–1997) and Second (1998–2003) Congo Wars. Subsequently, we highlight the
counter-productive effects of this strategy, showing the contentious nature of the
2 J. Verweijen and K. Vlassenroot
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creation of Minembwe territory and how this has continued to feed into armed mobil-
isation after its suppression in the wake of a peace agreement. Lastly, we reﬂect upon
recent events to further illustrate the complexity of the links between armed mobilis-
ation and conﬂicts related to the territory, identity, authority nexus, demonstrating the
ongoing relevance of these links for explaining the Kivus’ security predicament.
The article draws on intermittent ethnographic ﬁeldwork conducted in and around
theHauts Plateaux areabetween 1997 and 2014, consisting of semi-structured individual
and group interviews, and (participant) observation. Over time, hundreds of interviews
have been conducted with different categories of informants, including customary
chiefs, village elders andnotables, religious andother community leaders, politico-admin-
istrative authorities, civil society organisations, members of the security services, and the
political andmilitary leadership of armed groups andmilitias. Research on the Plateaux
was conducted in dozens of villages in a wide range of areas, including in isolated zones
only accessible on foot, such as Bijombo, Kamombo, andMibunda. A part of the inter-
views were conducted at weekly markets, like those of Bijombo-Ishenge, Mikalati, and
Kalingi, which regroup people from all corners of the Plateaux. The information
obtained through the ﬁeldwork was corroboratedwith and complemented by documen-
tary research, including reports from local and international Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs), various agencies of the United Nations (UN), press releases
and other political communication of armed groups, academic literature, and un-
published works including master theses from students originating from the Hauts
Plateaux and surrounding areas.
The historical roots of the territory, identity, authority nexus in the Kivus
While territory is by deﬁnition imbued with power relations and always has identity-
related dimensions (Paasi 1986; Sack 1986), in the Kivus, these aspects have become
particularly salient in structuring social and political space. This is in part a legacy
of the colonial system of indirect rule. Striving to control vast tracts of territory
without the costly endeavour of building up a comprehensive administrative appar-
atus, the Congo’s colonisers harnessed ‘native chiefs’ as intermediaries of government,
capitalising on what was believed to be their ‘traditional legitimacy’. In order to maxi-
mise the efﬁciency of this system, the colonisers set out to create relatively homo-
geneous, territorially ﬁxed administrative units or chefferies (chiefdoms). These
encompassed what were believed to be distinct ‘ethnic groups’, organised in a pyrami-
dal manner under the leadership of paramount rulers or bami (plural of mwami, cus-
tomary chief) (Mamdani 1998). However, in the face of a multitude of often mobile,
intermingled and socio-politically heterogeneously organised groups, the development
of such ‘tribal homelands’ (Mamdani 2011, 31) required signiﬁcant social engineering.
While some groups constituted relatively centralised, well circumscribed and hier-
archically structured polities, such as kingdoms, many others were organised in a
more horizontal, fragmented, and ﬂuid fashion, lacking a paramount ruler with
strong political power and a hierarchical social structure. Similarly, forms of identiﬁ-
cation were generally not primarily ‘ethnic’, but shaped by a variety of overlapping
allegiances and social positions, including socio-economic and ritual status, and
kinship and lineage afﬁliations (Newbury 1991). Thus, the creation of hierarchically
organised, ﬁxed ‘tribal homelands’ required the re-engineering of social and authority
structures, by means of the merging, splitting and shifting around of lineage groups
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 3
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and (sub)clans, the territorial ﬁxing of previously mobile groups, and the investment
and removal of chiefs (Hoffmann 2014; Muchukiwa 2006).
In their attempt to develop new systems of local governance, the colonisers were
guided by and produced cartographic, physical-anthropological and ethnographic
forms of knowledge, trying to identify and map ‘ethnic groups’, and ﬁx the boundaries
between them. In this manner, a body of ‘scientiﬁc’ knowledge emerged that strongly
informed colonial discourse and administrative and educational practice (Maxwell
2008; Newbury 1978). Through everyday interactions with the colonial institutions,
in particular the church-run educational system, the colonial subject was socialised
into this knowledge, thus gradually coming to see ethnic identiﬁcation and related
belonging to a territorial unit of governance as ‘normal’ and desirable (Hoffmann
2014; Jewsiewicki 1989). The reiﬁcation of the link between belonging to a particular
‘ethnic group’ and belonging to a particular bounded space (which could be described
as the territorialisation of ethnicity) was further promoted by colonial land policies.
Since all land in customary governance units was considered the exclusive property
of the ‘tribe’, groups who lacked a ‘tribal homeland’ could only access land by
paying tribute to the chiefs of other communities.2 Thus, the creation of a system of
contiguous customary units accentuated an insider/outsider dichotomy that would
become particularly visible in areas that witnessed growing pressures on land (Van
Acker 1999). Yet, it would also cause tensions in less densely populated areas such
as the Hauts Plateaux. One reason for this was that the dichotomy between groups
with and those without a ‘tribal chieftaincy’ was also rendered salient by the fact
that within the colony, customary chiefs were the predominant form of ‘native’ politi-
cal representation, as political and legal space became bifurcated into a politico-
administrative sphere monopolised by the colonisers and a native sphere regulated
by customary authority and law (Mamdani 1996).
In sum, the colonial era had a profound impact on imaginaries of political and social
order and related modes of subjectivity. Hailing from an ethnic community with a
clearly geographically demarcated ‘land of origins’ came to be seen as ‘the natural
order of things’, although the salience of ethnicity as a form of social identiﬁcation con-
tinued to strongly vary per group, era, and situation. Yet, the effects of processes of
ethnic and territorial reiﬁcation were very powerful, as ethnic communities came to
be represented as existing since times immemorial and as having a ‘natural right’ to
their ‘homeland’ that was justiﬁed by their ‘having arrived there ﬁrst’. Thus, a dichotomy
was created between communities identifying themselves as ‘born from the soil itself’,
hence ‘autochthones’ who ‘had arrived ﬁrst’ in a certain area, and those lacking a
‘tribal homeland’, often portrayed as ‘recent arrivals’, ‘immigrants’, and ‘foreigners’,
who were not ‘authentically Congolese’ (Jackson 2006). From the late colonial era
onwards, this distinction became increasingly salient politically, as it became enmeshed
with debates on the right to citizenship and electoral participation. This will be further
illustrated by the historical trajectory of one of the groups that came to be represented as
‘foreigners’ with dubious rights to citizenship and political representation, the Banya-
mulenge (singular: Munyamulenge) in South Kivu.
The Banyamulenge: becoming a ‘tribe’ without a ‘homeland’
The high political and emotional stakes of claims of belonging in the Kivus are well
reﬂected in the contested nature of the history of the Banyamulenge. Undoubtedly
4 J. Verweijen and K. Vlassenroot
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the most controversial issue is the date of their arrival on the territory of what is now
the Congo. While Rwandan historian Kagame (1972; quoted in Mutambo 1997, 21)
dates this arrival back to as early as the sixteenth century, others locate it in the eight-
eenth or nineteenth century. For example, based on a survey conducted in 1954–1955,
Hiernaux (1965) notes that since their arrival, six generations of what were then called
‘Banyarwanda’ (those coming from Rwanda) have lived on the Hauts Plateaux of
Itombwe. Despite these differences, there is a relatively broad consensus that the
largest group of this cattle-keeping population arrived at the end of the nineteenth
century, in a context of ongoing migratory ﬂux related to various political and econ-
omic factors, including political turmoil in the Rwandan Kingdom and the search for
new grazing grounds for cattle (Depelchin 1974; Muzuri 1983; Weis 1959). Since there
were no clearly demarcated international boundaries in that era, it is difﬁcult to label
this movement as ‘immigration’. Furthermore, although the Banyamulenge are at
present called a ‘Tutsi’ group, at the time of their movement, this designation was
not necessarily a salient form of social identiﬁcation, nor did it have ethnic connota-
tions in the regions from which they migrated, located in present-day Rwanda and
Burundi (Lemarchand 1994; Newbury 1988).
Settling ﬁrst in Kakamba in the Ruzizi Plain (now Uvira territory) the groups that
arrived at the end of the nineteenth century soon moved into the Moyens Plateaux
mountain range. They temporarily settled on a hill named ‘Mulenge’, where the
climate was favourable for their cattle. When the colonisers introduced a system of
petites chefferies (small chiefdoms) which partly echoed existing forms of socio-politi-
cal organisation, they invested two Banyarwanda chiefs: Kaïla or Kayira, one of the
leaders of the Mulenge-based group, and Gahutu or Kahutu, who headed another
group of cattle-keepers dwelling in the Ruzizi Plain. Both groups continued to be
semi-nomadic, which compounded the levying of taxes. This mobility, in combination
with their small size, meant that the colonial authorities deemed a separate entity for
these groups unnecessary when they started to further develop the local administration
from 1912 onwards (Muchukiwa 2006). In 1924, the group under Kaïla moved to the
Hauts Plateaux of Itombwe, ﬂeeing the exactions of Mokogabwe, the paramount chief
of the Bafuliiru, who had been providing them with access to grazing lands in
exchange for tribute. Depelchin notes that although the colonial administration
granted permission:
the Tutsi did not move en masse. Neither did they all move to Itombwe (… ). Those who
had the most to lose are probably the ones who sought to put the greatest distance
between themselves (and their cattle) and Mokogabwe. (1974, 72)
Thus, the Banyarwanda became scattered over the vast area comprising the Hauts
andMoyens Plateaux, living in mostly kinship-based groups that had relatively auton-
omous leaders. In certain zones, like Bijombo, there were large concentrations of
Banyarwanda villages, causing them to form a demographic majority.
Yet, in the 1920s, when the colonial authorities embarked upon an effort to terri-
torially restructure the local administration by means of the creation of larger custom-
ary structures or chefferies agrandies (enlarged chiefdoms, later turned into
collectivités-chefferies), the Banyarwanda were denied such an entity. As the petites
chefferies were suppressed, this rendered them subjects of the customary entities
ruled by other communities, notably the Bavira, Bafuliiru, and Babembe, although
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 5
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they did govern their own localités (villages) within these governance units. This exclu-
sion from customary governance and lands of their own, seen as a historical injustice,
turned into a symbolic point of reference around which future acts of political mobil-
isation and advocacy would be centred. A ﬁrst expression of this was the (unsuccessful)
request, in 1944, to centralise all the Banyarwanda-inhabited localités of the Bavira
chefferie (Buvira) located in the Bijombo area into a separate Banyarwanda chefferie.
Due to their fragmented organisation, the colonial authorities had demanded that the
Banyarwanda in Buvira designate one leader, preferring to deal with a single inter-
mediary rather than a multitude of chefs de localité (village chiefs). This role came
to be assumed by Budulege of Kishembwe locality, and later his relative Mushishi
Karoli, who gradually came to be seen as a type of acting chef de groupement (chief
of a groupement, a subdivision of a chefferie), although they ofﬁcially had no such
entity. This provided an important impetus for efforts to create a separate customary
entity for the Banyarwanda in Bijombo, which continue up to this day.
While living amongst other groups, the Banyarwanda remained relatively aloof in
a socio-cultural sense, mostly because of their distinct socio-economic status and dif-
fering customs. Although they gradually became more sedentary, they continued to
live primarily off their livestock. This led them to develop economic interdependencies
with other communities, exchanging foodstuffs for cattle and cattle-products. The
Banyamulenge also fostered alliances with those communities through forms of
cattle clientship, which constitute ultimately asymmetric relationships based on the
gift of cattle. Together with the fact that cattle were generally seen as a symbol of
wealth, this created the idea that the Banyarwanda were a dominant community
that imposed unfair terms of exchange. Their distinct forms of belonging, as mani-
fested in and (re)produced by a divergent lifestyle and customs, only reinforced this
social distance. Crucially, their habit to only accept cows as dowry created obstacles
to intermarriages with groups owning few cattle, like the Babembe, who came to
ascribe the lack of intermarriage to a misplaced sense of superiority. Yet the Banyar-
wanda could hardly be called an elite, lacking access to local authority and the new
economic and educational opportunities opened up by colonialism (Depelchin
1974). This would gradually change in the post-colonial era, when violent struggle
would contribute to the community’s political awakening.
The post-independence era: struggling for local authority and citizenship
In 1963, the revolutionary fervour that swept the Congo in the ﬁrst years of its inde-
pendence arrived in the region of Uvira, then spread to Fizi (Verhaegen 1966).
Anchored in an ideology of radical nationalism and anti-imperialism, the egalitarian
discourse of the Simba rebels held little appeal to the isolated and little educated
Banyarwanda, who interpreted it as ‘kngabana inka n’ababembe’ (the free distribution
of cattle to the Babembe) (Muzuri 1983, 96). Although initially staying aloof, the
Banyarwanda were eventually dragged into the conﬂict when the Simbas took their
refuge on the Plateaux in the wake of an offensive of the Congolese army. Once in
the mountains, the rebels commenced to tax and then loot their cattle,3 prompting
the Banyarwanda to reinforce a nascent self-defence militia called ‘Abagirye’,
derived from the French word guerrier (warrior) (Brabant and Nzweve 2013).
Trained and supplied by the government forces, this militia came to serve as an auxili-
ary force in the ﬁght against the insurgents, who were mostly of Bembe, Fuliiru and
6 J. Verweijen and K. Vlassenroot
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Vira origins. In this manner, despite being grounded in non-ethnic revolutionary dis-
courses, the insurgency obtained a strong ethnic dimension, pitting Banyarwanda
allied to the government against rebel forces from other communities.
The Simba rebellion and the Banyarwanda response to it had a twin effect on pol-
itical and social developments. On the one hand, they led to a sharp deterioration of
inter-community relations on the Plateaux, now laced with memories of violence. On
the other hand, they triggered a process of political awakening and a call for emanci-
pation among the Banyarwanda. While some of the Abagirye ﬁghters enrolled in the
national armed forces, other Banyarwanda gained improved access to civilian employ-
ment opportunities and education. As a result, the community became less isolated
and increasingly better educated, allowing for the formation of a politically aware
intellectual elite that started to claim political rights (Vlassenroot 2002). In 1966, a
part of this elite who had regrouped around Rumenera Sebasonera Obed (or Kabar-
ule), a schoolteacher who had come to play an important role in the administration of
the collectivité-chefferie of the Bavira during the Simba rebellion, lodged a demand for
the creation of an independent groupement in Bijombo. This request was however met
with ﬁerce resistance from other communities. Additionally, the leadership of Kabar-
ule created divisionswithin the Banyarwanda community itself. The group around him
issued from a new educated elite, who framed the creation of the groupement in terms
of modernising the local administration. For them, the existing system of customary
chiefdoms was an archaic, colonial creation that did not respond to changing socio-
economic and demographic realities. Thus, they proposed to create a groupement of
which the leader would be elected, anticipating favourable outcomes given that the
Banyarwanda were the demographic majority in Bijombo. The descendants of Budu-
lege, however, insisted that any future entity had to be inscribed in the customary
order, claiming leadership on the basis of their descendence. Crucially, maintaining
the customary order would reinforce the Banyarwanda’s claims to the status of ‘auth-
entic Congolese’, reﬂecting the principle that only communities with a ‘tribal home-
land’ were ‘born from the soil’ and therefore entitled to Congolese citizenship. In
this manner, the conﬂicts around the groupement of Bijombo starkly reveal the ten-
sions resulting from the continuing bifurcated nature of the Congolese post-colonial
state, characterized by the uneasy co-existence of the customary-ethnic and state-
administrative spheres (Muchukiwa 2006).
The growing political emancipation of the Banyarwanda was also manifested in
their efforts to change their name to ‘Banyamulenge’, or ‘those from Mulenge’, refer-
ring to the hill in theMoyens Plateaux where a part of their ancestors had temporarily
lived. In a context rife with the politics of origins, the choice for a name linked to a
place in South Kivu was highly contentious, for it symbolically communicated the
message that they should be considered as an ‘original Congolese tribe’, who therefore
had the right to Congolese citizenship. Thus, although the name ‘Banyamulenge’
became a commonplace designation in the 1970s, hardliners from other communities
refuted it, seeing it as a ploy from the Banyarwanda to ‘mask their real origins’, and
therefore unjustly claim citizenship. This controversy had already become apparent in
1969, when the administrator of Itombwe, with the support of the Mwami of the
Bavira and local security services, refused to attribute identity cards to the Banyamu-
lenge. They were countered by the provincial governor, who invoked the citizenship
law then in force, saying that ‘the Banyarwanda undoubtedly have Congolese nation-
ality of origins, given that they were in Zaire [sic] before 1908’ (authors’ translation)
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 7
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(Muzuri 1983, 116). A similar scenario risked developing again in 1973, yet met with a
ﬁrm response from the governor.
Despite the controversy surrounding their name and citizenship rights, the Banya-
mulenge’s efforts to increase their political participation did make some progress. In
1970, the Munyamulenge politician Frédéric Muhoza Gisaro entered the conseil lég-
islatif (national parliament), the ﬁrst time in history a Munyamulenge gained access to
elected ofﬁce at the national level. Gisaro energetically campaigned for a separate
administrative entity called collectivité des Hauts Plateaux d’Itombwe. In 1979, this
project experienced a small breakthrough when the authorities formally recognised
the groupement of Bijombo. This entity had already been created by the Mwami of
the Bavira, Lenghe III, in 1971, who had named Sebasonera as chef de groupement
ad interim, but was awaiting ofﬁcial status. The groupement brought together 18 vil-
lages, 12 of which were headed by a Munyamulenge chief. However, and against the
advice of the Uvira district commissioner and the governor of Kivu, Lenghe III
refused to appoint a Munyamulenge as its chief, emphasising that this was a violation
of customary principles (Muchukiwa 2006). He therefore appointed a Muvira, whose
authority was not recognised by the Banyamulenge. The latter continued to be gov-
erned by their own leaders, generating parallel systems of local governance that
have never ceased to exist.
The resistance of Lenghe III foreshadowed the roughening of the political climate
from the end of the 1970s onwards, when the Banyamulenge’s citizenship, and by
implication electoral participation, would be increasingly contested. In 1981 the
conseil législatif modiﬁed the 1972 nationality law, determining that only descendants
of ‘tribes’ established on the Congo’s territory in its boundaries of 1 August 1885
would automatically have citizenship (Willame 1997). This change in legislation refo-
cused the discussion on the Banyamulenge’s migration, with adversaries arguing they
had only arrived after the establishment of the Congo Free State in 1885. These doubts
allowed the new law to be used as a tool to exclude the Banyamulenge from electoral
participation. In both the 1982 and 1987 elections, their candidates were barred from
running on the basis of nationalité douteuse (doubtful nationality). In the last case, this
prompted them to refuse to vote and to destroy ballot boxes on the Plateaux (Ruhim-
bika 2001).
By that time, a new elite of young, well-educated Banyamulenge decided to take up
the case of their community and instituted a number of local development initiatives,
which received support from the Banyamulenge wing of the Protestant Church and the
Banyamulenge comités des sages (committees of the wise), regrouping elders and com-
munity leaders. In 1985, two of them, Müller Ruhimbika and Azarias Ruberwa (who
later became the president of the RCD rebel movement and then vice-president of the
transitional government between 2003–2006), invited all Banyamulenge students to
Itombwe to discuss how the position of their community could be reinforced. Reject-
ing a strategy par le haut (from the top down), they decided to promote local develop-
ment through their own initiatives. Some of the organisations taking up this call would
be quite successful in attracting international funding and attention, and played a
pivotal role in the further political awakening of the community. As they argued,
development depended on the recognition of the Banyamulenge’s political rights (to
citizenship and territory) and full access to land (Vlassenroot 2002).
Yet, this recognition was not forthcoming. By contrast, in the 1990s, inter-
communal tensions would intensify, mostly as a result of national and regional
8 J. Verweijen and K. Vlassenroot
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developments. An announced transition to multiparty democracy generated vigor-
ous competition between political elites, who employed ethnic discourses in their
efforts at electoral mobilisation. Thus, the district commissioner of Uvira and
Anzuluni Bembe Isilonyonyi, a Bembe leader and deputy speaker of the transitional
parliament, launched the umpteenth exclusion campaign against the Banyamulenge.
Further adding to the turmoil was the inﬂux of hundreds of thousands of refugees
mixed with combatants from Burundi and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994, who
were ﬂeeing civil war and (anticipated) massacres (Willame 1997). The resulting ten-
sions prompted the transitional parliament in April 1995 to adopt a resolution
calling for the expulsion of all Rwandan refugees, explicitly assimilating the Banya-
mulenge into that category. The Uvira-based weekly Munanira responded with
enthusiasm:
Finally, the foul play has been unmasked. The Rwandan of Tutsi ethnicity who has immi-
grated to Zaire since a certain time and who presents himself as ‘Zaï-Rwa’4 after intelli-
gently inventing an ethnicity (tribe or clan) unknown in the history of Zaire, the
Munyamulenge, has been identiﬁed and exposed. This trickster Zaïrwa of yesterday is
but a Rwandan of a morphology and ideology similar to Paul Kagame (authors’ trans-
lation). (quoted in Ruhimbika 2001, 31)
On his return to Uvira and Fizi, Anzuluni stirred up anti-Banyamulenge senti-
ments in a number of public speeches, which encouraged the Uvira district commis-
sioner to start executing the resolution voted in parliament. Harassment of
Banyamulenge now became widespread, and members of the community started to
be denied access to employment and work in the administration, while their develop-
ment associations were sanctioned (Vlassenroot 2002).
The widespread identiﬁcation of Banyamulenge with Rwandan Tutsi in this
period was reinforced by the recruitment of a signiﬁcant number of Banyamulenge
youths in the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front, which had launched an insurgency
campaign against the Kigali government in 1990. Faced with decreasing employ-
ment opportunities due to discrimination and economic decline, these youths
had responded favourably to the call for arms, with some hoping that a future
new regime in Rwanda could help ameliorate their precarious position in Zaire. In
1995, these young combatants started to return to the Plateaux, a movement that
intensiﬁed in July 1996, causing anti-Tutsi sentiment to explode. In September
1996, two major anti-Tutsi protest marches were held in Uvira and Bukavu, with
participants chanting slogans like ‘Mututsi na imbwa wote ni sawa (Tutsi
and dogs are all the same)’ (Ruhimbika 2001, 50) and ‘Opération RRR, rendre les
Rwandais au Rwanda’ (Operation RRR, return the Rwandans to Rwanda) (Commu-
nauté Banyamulenge 2008). This accelerated the cycle of tit-for-tat massacres
that had been generated by the inﬁltration of Banyamulenge recruits, which drew
in local militias and the Zairian army. Bembe militias killed over 300 Banyamulenge
in Baraka, Banyamulenge attacked a hospital in Lemera, killing nurses and patients,
and the Zairian army looted Uvira. Soon after, units of the Rwandan Patriotic Army
(RPA) entered the country and started raiding the refugee camps, heralding the
advent of a mixed regional-domestic insurgent coalition aiming to topple Mobutu,
the Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL).5
The First Congo War had begun.
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The Congo Wars (1996–2003) and the militarisation of (resistance to) territorial
claims
The arrival of the AFDL provided the impetus for the large-scale formation of armed
groups in the rural areas that operated under the label of ‘Mai-Mai’, which often
claimed to defend speciﬁc communities and their lands, employing discourses of
self-defence and autochthony. Considering the insurgency a Tutsi-dominated
‘foreign occupation force’ due to the heavy Rwandan imprint and strong Banyamu-
lenge involvement, they tried to resist the advance of the AFDL troops, while also
multiplying attacks on the Banyamulenge (Vlassenroot and Van Acker 2001). As a
consequence, and with the echoes of the Rwandan genocide still resonating, feelings
of existential threat took hold among the Banyamulenge. Together with the promise
that future regime change offered in terms of improving their situation, this caused
many Banyamulenge to ﬂock to the AFDL. Their alliance with the RPA, however,
soon proved to be both a curse and a blessing. Although the AFDL insurrection
gave them unprecedented access to military and political power, in particular after
it toppled Mobutu in 1997, their close collaboration with Rwanda reinforced resent-
ment from neighbouring communities, seeing it as new evidence that the Banyamu-
lenge were in fact Rwandans. It is telling in this respect that the name
‘Banyamulenge’ became in this period a designation with often a pejorative connota-
tion among local actors and international observers for all Congolese Tutsi, including
those from North Kivu who had a very different historical trajectory. Importantly,
Banyamulenge were increasingly framed as ﬁfth-columnists for the expansionist
tendencies of Rwanda, suspected of wanting to annex the Kivus to an enlarged
‘Hima-Tutsi empire’ in Central Africa and in this manner ‘balkanise’ the Congo.
This balkanisation plot became an important lens through which the Banyamulenge’s
territorial claims were viewed, intensifying efforts to resist their aspirations.
The counter-productive effects of participation in the AFDL insurgency did not go
unnoticed among the Banyamulenge. This awareness led to growing resentment
among parts of the community towards Kigali, which, they felt, had instrumentalised
their plight. Consequently, attempts by the RPA to convince Banyamulenge leaders to
bring their families to safer grounds in Rwanda met with strong resistance. The idea of
what was seen as ‘deportation’ was ﬁrst proposed by the RPA in October 1996, then
again discussed between the RPA and Banyamulenge leaders during a meeting in
Butare (Rwanda) in December 1996 (Ruhimbika 2001). It testiﬁes to Kigali’s
limited knowledge of the dynamics within the Banyamulenge community, mainly con-
sidered to be a Rwandan Tutsi diaspora. Within the Congo, these views only con-
ﬁrmed representations of the Banyamulenge as immigrants who had no right to
Congolese citizenship, thereby contributing to worsening, rather than improving
their predicament. What also provoked resentment among the Banyamulenge, in par-
ticular the military, was the continuing dominance of Kigali, which barred Banyamu-
lenge from decision-making and command positions. The mutiny of 300
Banyamulenge soldiers in Bukavu in February 1998 was a clear indication that they
no longer accepted exclusive RPA leadership.6 In this climate of growing distrust
vis-à-vis Kigali, a group of mostly Banyamulenge political actors gathered in Bujum-
bura, the capital of neighbouring Burundi, in June 1998. On 14 June 1998, they
announced the creation of a political movement called Forces républicaines féderalistes
(FRF), in which Müller Ruhimbika came to play a leading role. The FRF advocated
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political and military independence from Rwanda as the most viable route for Banya-
mulenge emancipation, believing that their precarious position in the Congo could
only be resolved by creating an autonomous state on the Plateaux as part of a feder-
ated Congo.7
While the idea of federalism found widespread appeal among the Banyamulenge,
the outbreak of the Second Congo War would prevent the FRF from becoming a
major political force, necessitating them to operate underground. In August 1998, a
newRwanda-led rebellionwas launched, this time under thebannerof theRCD.As pol-
itical leaders in Kinshasa tried to mobilise the population by employing inﬂammatory
anti-Tutsi rhetoric, anti-Banyamulenge sentiment surged, culminating in massacres of
Tutsi civilians and soldiers throughout the country. This made many Banyamulenge
painfully aware that they neededRwanda to ensure their survival, driving them – some-
times reluctantly – into the arms of the RCD. Yet divisions among the Banyamulenge
were growing, further fragilising the community. Some political and military leaders
joined the RCD voluntarily, hoping that the new rebellion could accomplish what the
AFDL had failed to do in terms of securing citizenship and a territory for the Banya-
mulenge, or embraced it as an opportunity to advance their personal careers. Others,
including church leaders and civil society members, tried to distance themselves from
the rebellion, hoping to establish a new dialogue with the other communities on and
around the Plateaux. A third group was the most outspoken in its resistance against
the RCD, and instead supported the FRF (Vlassenroot 2002).
Anxious about losing support among the Banyamulenge, the RCD resorted to
redrawing administrative boundaries to curry their favour, a technique it employed
more widely to co-opt allies who were deemed strategic (Tull 2005).8 On 9 September
1999, the RCD administration issued a decree9 that created a new territoire (territory)
on the Plateaux, following a formal request signed by 15 Banyamulenge intellectuals
and leaders from different localities. This group consisted mostly of ambitious political
actors who tried to seize upon the RCD rebellion to realise far-reaching territorial
aspirations for the Banyamulenge. In fact, the idea of creating an entire territory
had only gained widespread currency in the AFDL era, when the opportunities gen-
erated by future regime change seemed boundless (Willame 1997). The reasons for-
warded in the request, which had a map with the proposed boundaries annexed to
it, are largely similar to those accompanying the earlier efforts for the creation of
the groupement of Bijombo, referring to identity-related, historical, and political-econ-
omic considerations. These included the Banyamulenge’s precolonial arrival, their dis-
crimination in colonial times, the underdevelopment of the Plateaux due to the
scarcity of administrative, road, and communications infrastructure, the under-rep-
resentation of the Banyamulenge in public administration and their lack of secure
access to land. What was called the territory of Minembwe, after the locality that
became the seat of the administration, had ﬁve new collectivités-secteurs (Bijombo,
Mulenge, Kamombo, Minembwe, and Itombwe). While some positions in the territor-
ial administration were ﬁlled by non-Banyamulenge, the administrateur du territoire
(territorial administrator) as well as the chiefs of most of the newly created secteurs
and groupements were Banyamulenge. This reﬂected the demographic realities of the
new entity, the boundaries of which were drawn around the traditional living area
of the Banyamulenge. Given that a territory is simultaneously an electoral circum-
scription, this also raised the hopes that the Banyamulenge would stand better
chances in any future elections.
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In the short term, however, the creation of the territory was a mixed blessing at
best, leading to further deterioration of already extremely tense inter-community
relations. For the multitude of Mai-Mai groups that waged a counter-insurgency cam-
paign against the RCD in the rural areas, the creation of the territory added fuel to the
ﬁre. Being carved out of the territories of Mwenga, Uvira, and Fizi, the self-styled
autochthonous communities on whose soil the new entity was located felt deprived
of lands to which they felt a deep attachment, considering them to be inhabited by
their mizimu ya mababu (spirits of the ancestors), and thus an integral part of their
heritage and identity as an ethnic group. Furthermore, many lower-level chiefs
strongly resented that they were no longer placed under customary chiefs from their
own community, being henceforth governed by a Banyamulenge-dominated local
administration. Opposition was further informed by the loss of income resulting
from the creation of the new territory, which was not only related to the economic
value of the lost land and the natural resources that it harboured, including various
artisanal gold mines, but also the diminishing access to market taxes (ADEPAE
et al. 2011). Finally, resistance against Minembwe territory was fed by the unilateral
way in which it had been created, without any form of prior consultation of the other
communities, and in violation of the law. In particular the fact that it had been
imposed by a rebel administration nourished the idea that the territory was born
out of violence, not only rendering it illegitimate, but, in the eyes of some, also justify-
ing a violent response.
Aside from generating opposition against its existence, the creation of Minembwe
territory gave rise to a host of boundary disputes among existing and newly created
secteurs, groupements, and localités. Furthermore, it placed previously relatively
autonomous Banyamulenge chefs de localités under a new hierarchical layer of Banya-
mulenge authority in the form of the groupements. This led to frictions among the
quite horizontally organised Banyamulenge, in particular since some locality chiefs
were now commanded by those previously subordinate to them. Additionally, some
localités were converted into groupements, leading to frustrations among those
denied this upgrade in status. Hence the territory of Minembwe did not only create
inter-community tensions, but also became a bone of contention within the Banyamu-
lenge community, further tearing open its internal rifts (Muchukiwa 2006).
These growing divisions were to a large extent nourished by conﬂicting political
orientations, including among the Banyamulenge ofﬁcers serving in the armed
branch of the RCD under RPA (Rwandan military) command, who felt instrumenta-
lised, marginalised and unjustly blamed for some of the massacres committed by RCD
troops. Mistrust eventually turned into open hostility, with a ﬁrst standoff in January
1999 in Uvira, where Banyamulenge under the command of Paciﬁque Masunzu
clashed with the RPA.10 In 2002, Masunzu, who sympathised with the underground
FRF party, deserted and took to the bush, soon attracting a larger following (Vlassen-
root 2002). The Rwandan government reacted with resolve. When an initial offensive
of Rwanda-supported RCD troops failed, it deployed an RPA force of thousands of
troops with considerable air support against a few hundred Banyamulenge soldiers
collaborating with Mai-Mai groups. This ﬁerce resistance against the RPA/RCD
gave Masunzu considerable popularity among the Banyamulenge, and a favourable
status with the Kinshasa government, in particular President Kabila. Consequently,
when in September 2002, the RPA and RCD withdrew from the Plateaux under inter-
national pressure, Masunzu and the FRF, to whom he had formally linked his armed
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force, were left as the main political and military players. Ironically, this heralded the
end of the territory of Minembwe, which got disconnected from the RCD controlled
politico-military administration. Yet, while losing its formal existence, its symbolic
and mobilising power remained invariably strong.
Throughout the post-colonial era, the Banyamulenge, who were socialised into the
idea that having a customary territory is a precondition for being recognised as an
‘authentic Congolese tribe’, strived to redress their exclusion from a customary chief-
dom by the colonisers. Deprived of access to local authority and land of their own,
they explicitly adopted a toponymic name linking them to the Congolese soil in
order to legitimise their political and identity claims. Yet the same nexus of territory,
identity, and authority that informed their territorial aspirations nourished resistance
among other communities, considering these claims not only as a threat to their power,
but also to their ancestral lands, and therefore their identity. In the 1990s, after non-
violent channels to realise their demands were increasingly blocked due to electoral
and administrative exclusion, rebellion emerged as an attractive option for securing
their position. However, allying with Rwanda, who spearheaded the insurgencies in
which they participated, reinforced doubts about their nature as Congolese citizens
and caused further social exclusion. Furthermore, the fact that they eventually
obtained a territory by manipulating a rebel-led administration fostered the feeling
that they pursued their territorial claims by force, which justiﬁed a violent response.
The bloodshed that took place in the course of the wars only further raised the sym-
bolic and emotional stakes of the Banyamulenge’s territorial claims. While for the
Banyamulenge, a territory of their own became seen as a precondition for their survi-
val, for other communities, it was a reminder of ‘Tutsi aggression and expansionism’.
These representations would continue to shape political struggles and armed mobilis-
ation in the post-settlement era, long after the territory had been suppressed.
The post-settlement era: territorial claims as mobilising narrative for renewed armed
struggle
In December 2002, a peace accord was signed that announced the formal end of the
Second Congo War. It provided for a double political and military power-sharing
deal, implying that the ex-belligerents would share positions in the transitional poli-
tico-administrative apparatus and integrate their forces into a newly constituted
national military, the Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
(FARDC). This unleashed vigorous power struggles, both within and between ex-bel-
ligerents and their constituencies, who all tried to stake out their claims to the new pol-
itical order. Masunzu and other Banyamulenge leaders were not exempt from this
logic, and tried to consolidate or reinforce their position by a variety of non-violent
and violent means.
In 2003, the transitional government indicated it might not recognise Minembwe
territory, leading to its ultimate suppression in 2007.11 As a consequence, the most
inﬂuential politico-administrative authority on large parts of the Plateaux, in particu-
lar on the Fizi and a part of the Mwenga side, now became the chef de poste of Mine-
mbwe, formally deployed under the administrateur du territoire of Fizi.12 The new chef
de poste had been (informally) appointed byMasunzu, who had accepted the suppres-
sion of Minembwe territory. One of the main reasons for this was that he was wary to
lose his favourable status in the presidential circle, which would imperil his ambition to
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become a general. Additionally, Masunzu’s camp believed that the government would
eventually re-erect the territory, but this time following the correct procedures. Like
many other Banyamulenge, they believed that the territory had been created unilater-
ally, and insisted that any efforts at its resurrection should be preceded by consul-
tations with the other communities living on the Plateaux. This reﬂected the
conviction that having a separate territory on the Plateaux would be to the beneﬁt
of all of its inhabitants, regardless of their ethnic background, as it could lead to
better local governance and promote development. Thus, while endorsing the idea
of a new territory, Masunzu’s camp was critical of the ways in which it had been
created by the RCD, which had given off the impression that it concerned a project
by the Banyamulenge for the Banyamulenge. Even when sharing this reading of its
problematic creation, a substantial part of the Banyamulenge still rejected the terri-
tory’s suppression, fearing that it would be irreversible. Furthermore, many believed
that the ﬁnal peace accord signed in December 2002 contained a clause that it
would not turn back the decisions made by the RCD administration. From this per-
spective, the non-recognition of the territory was experienced as a betrayal and a vio-
lation of the peace accord, feeding hostility towards Kinshasa. These ideas caused the
shutting down of the territory’s ofﬁce in Minembwe by Masunzu’s troops to provoke
highly emotional reactions. Up to today, people memorise this event as a ‘putsch’ and
a ‘coup d’état’, leading the current authorities to be ‘clandestine’.13 As one informant
explained: ‘it’s like having a full glass in your hand when you are thirsty, but you are
not allowed to drink’.14
Aside fromdisagreements over the territory, which played both in pro- and anti-RCD
circles,Masunzu’s rule provokedother controversies. In an effort to consolidate his power
position, he side-lined several inﬂuential members of the FRF. He also allegedly reneged
on promises to do the utmost to ensure that his troops and ofﬁcers obtained ranks and
positions of importance in the FARDC.When the new nominations of FARDC ofﬁcers
were made public in 2004, it turned out that none of his ofﬁcers had obtained a rank
higher than major. This led to strong resentment, especially since Masunzu himself was
eventually appointed general. Furthermore, Masunzu was accused of doing little to
advance the political agenda of the FRF in Kinshasa, being suspected of primarily
trying to secure his own favourable status in the networks of the president. Discontent
with his rule was also fed by his background: coming from a small and traditionally rela-
tively insigniﬁcant clan, inﬂuentialﬁgures from the bigger andmore powerful clans found
it difﬁcult to accept his leadership. This played out both amongst the RCD stalwarts and
those who had rallied towards the FRF.
Thus, personal ambitions, diverging political orientations and clan politics all fed
into growing competition between Banyamulenge political-military elites, which
blocked efforts to unite the community and rally it behind a coherent leadership
that could promote its common interests. Certainly, a united leadership had never
existed among the Banyamulenge, who have always had a plurality of poles of
power issuing from geographic, socio-economic, clan, lineage, educational, and
professional differences. Yet the transition set in motion a more pronounced fragmen-
tation than ever, despite efforts to counter this dynamic. Also, now that Minembwe
territory would be suppressed, the Banyamulenge faced bleak electoral prospects.
Moreover, they obtained only few positions of importance in the transitional
politico-administrative apparatus, and the waning power of the RCD undermined
its function as a gateway to ofﬁce. Therefore, non-violent channels to push through
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political demands and realise personal ambitions were increasingly blocked. This
prompted some of the competing factions to resort to arms, reﬂecting the extent to
which Banyamulenge politics had become militarised over the years, with military
elites taking precedence over political and customary leaders. However, in contrast
to the war era, armed mobilisation focused less on defending the Banayamulenge com-
munity and its rights than on securing personal and factional ambitions, provoking
internecine ﬁghting within the community.
In 2005, two new Banyamulenge armed factions appeared on the Plateaux with
what were initially unclear agendas, except for a refusal to integrate into the
FARDC, personal frustrations about having been attributed low ranks in the
FARDC, and discontent with Masunzu’s leadership. Over the following two years,
these two factions clashed intermittently with the 112th brigade FARDC headquar-
tered in Minembwe, which was an all-Banyamulenge unit directly controlled by
Masunzu. In 2007, in spite of having quite a divergent political outlook and history,
the leaders of these two factions, pro-Kigali RCD stalwart Venant Bisogo and anti-
Kigali, anti-RCD activist Michel ‘Makanika’ Rukundwa, eventually decided to join
hands. The FRF political leadership, leading a marginal existence after having been
sidelined by Masunzu, saw this as an opportunity to re-establish itself on the political
scene, this time with a military wing to help push through its demands. In this manner,
and quite in contrast to the spirit of some of its founding fathers, the FRF was once
more reconstituted as a political-military movement. In order to ﬁnd a common plat-
form and obtain popular support, it adopted as one of its most salient political claims
an issue that continued to stir the spirits of many Banyamulenge, being seen as a pre-
condition for improving their plight: the resurrection of Minembwe territory. This
became particularly visible during the Amani peace conference held in Goma in
January 2008, which was attended by nearly two dozen armed groups (some only
created or reinstituted for participating in the conference to get a share of the
‘peace dividend’) as well as representatives from the different ethnic communities of
the Kivus. Like all other armed groups, the FRF presented a cahier the charges (list
of demands) outlining the conditions on which they would lay down arms. One of
the points on this list was ‘granting Minembwe the statute of territory. This is a
demand of all the ethnic groups who live in that part of the Republic (authors’ trans-
lation)’ (Gasore 2007). This resonated with the speech of the representatives of the
Banyamulenge community, who listed as key recommendation ‘recognising the terri-
tory of Minembwe for reasons of at once political representativeness, bringing public
services closer to the people and the development of the Hauts Plateaux (authors’
translation)’ (Communauté Banyamulenge 2008). Furthermore, they emphasised
that ‘those opposing it [the territory] inscribe themselves purely and simply in the
logic of extremists who ﬁght against the political emancipation of the Banyamulenge
(authors’ translation)’ (Communauté Banyamulenge 2008).
Born as a coalition of strange bedfellows, the FRF thus adopted advocacy for
Minembwe territory as a mobilising and legitimising narrative that strongly resonated
among broad layers of the Banyamulenge community. This beﬁtted the movement’s
growing role as local governance actor, which was triggered by its obtaining de
facto control over the Mibunda and Kamombo areas of the Plateaux following a
cease-ﬁre agreement signed in October 2007. Developing a more comprehensive pol-
itical branch with departments like social affairs, environment, justice, and political
propaganda, the FRF now started to emphasise good governance and development
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in its discursive and some of its social practices, organising, for example, the construc-
tion of a road from Mikalati to Kabara and a bridge over the river Lwelila. Yet invol-
vement in local governance also allowed the movement to more effectively repress
opponents, and to increase its sources of income by implementing an elaborate
system of market, mining, and road taxes (UNSC 2009). Furthermore, despite more
political activism, the military branch continued to dominate the movement. This
was strongly evidenced by negotiations with the group undertaken in the framework
of the Amani process, in which the modalities of troop integration into the government
forces took centre stage. Above all, FRF ofﬁcers, meanwhile including two self-
appointed generals, demanded that their rebel ranks be recognised in the FARDC,
that they would be paid ‘salary arrears’ since 2004, and that after integration, they
would continue to be deployed on the Plateaux. These demands reveal the heterogen-
eity of the projects driving the new-style FRF, born of a power struggle between pol-
itical and military Banyamulenge leaders who contested the dominance of Masunzu
out of at once personal ambitions, clan and factional interests, and diverging political
visions, including on Minembwe territory. Thus, while Minembwe territory ﬁgured
prominently in the FRF’s political communication, being an important narrative to
mobilise support for and legitimise taking up arms, this did not imply that it was
the sole or main driver of the FRF’s rebellion.
A similar complex and ﬂuctuating relation between the narrative of Minembwe
territory and armed mobilisation can be detected among the variety of Mai-Mai
groups that remobilised or continued ﬁghting in the post-settlement era. Similar to
the FRF, these groups would discursively justify their refusal to integrate into the
FARDC by referring to the territory of Minembwe. However, they invoked its poten-
tial reconstitution, rather than its suppression, as the main cause of their dissidence
(Verweijen forthcoming). But this was not the only reason for continued armed
struggle. As was the case for the Banyamulenge, the transition unleashed important
power struggles between and within often already heavily divided war-era factions,
all hoping to gain access to positions in the military or the politico-administrative
apparatus. In this climate of competition and mistrust, certain Mai-Mai groups
refused to abandon their ﬁefs and integrate their troops into the FARDC. These
groups feared becoming marginalised in the military, which many Mai-Mai per-
ceived to be dominated by Tutsi and Hutu belonging to the ex-RCD (Baaz and
Verweijen 2013). These fears were only reinforced by the emergence of the Bisogo
and Makanika factions on the Plateaux, seen as a conﬁrmation that the Banyamu-
lenge continued to have bellicose intentions, threatening other communities’ lands,
livelihoods and very existence. Consequently, in the course of 2006–2007, a host
of new Mai-Mai groups appeared on the scene, in majority composed of war-era
ﬁghters. In order to justify their dissidence, many of these groups referred to the
Banyamulenge’s demands for the re-institution of Minembwe territory, and the
non-integrated Banyamulenge armed factions on the Plateaux. Explaining why he
withdrew from the army integration process in 2007, Mai-Mai leader William
Amuri Yakotumba stated:
we were in conﬂict with an aggressing people [peuple agresseur]. So we said ‘if these forces
[of Bisogo] leave the Hauts Plateaux and when the chefs de localités can recover their
power over the entire territory of their entities like before, we are ready to leave the
bush.’15
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The groups’ political leader Raphael Looba Undji added:
the biggest problem is that they, the Rwandans, want to install other entities of local gov-
ernance. We cannot accept that a native chief [chef originaire] is subjected to the orders of
the chefferie of a so-called ‘Munyamulenge’. ‘Native’ [originaire], this notion has a lot of
importance to us.16
These convictions were also reﬂected in Mai-Mai groups’ political propaganda, in
which they portrayed Minembwe territory as the symbol of Banyamulenge hegemony,
expansionism and aggression, and as a justiﬁcation to take up arms. For example, at
the 2008 Goma conference, a representative of theMai Mai reformé (as Yakotumba’s
group was then called) stated that one of their main goals was ‘resisting any forced
integration of Rwandan Tutsi refugees under the cover of having an autonomous ter-
ritory in our territory of Fizi because the Banyamulenge do not exist in DRC but there
are Rwandan refugees and immigrants (authors’ translation)’ (Assanda Mwenebatu
2008, 6). In a cahier de charges issued in 2011, this same group states that:
the government knows that the erection of MINEMBWE as Territoire and the entry of
foreign forces will provoke a ﬁre that will last andwill thus continue to burn with intensity
as long as there will be straw, that is a second Palestine in Africa. (authors’ translation)
(Mai Mai Reformé/Groupe Alleluia/Yakotumba 2011, 4)
This clearly illustrates how even after its abolishment, Minembwe territory con-
tinues to stir the spirits, occupying a pre-eminent place in the discursive frames of poli-
tico-military entrepreneurs. In addition, it shows that although article 10 of the 2006
constitution bestows Congolese ‘nationality of origins’ (nationalité d’origine) upon all
persons from ethnic groups living on Congolese soil at the moment of independence
(1960), Mai-Mai groups still cast doubt on the Banyamulenge’s right to Congolese
citizenship.
A similar complex relation between identity-linked claims for territorialised auth-
ority and militia activity has continued to shape developments in the groupement of
Bijombo, where parallel systems of governance and conﬂicts related to the localités
created as part of Minembwe territory have persisted. Erratic governance by the
Mwami of the Bavira, who has simultaneously appointed a number of chefs de groupe-
ment, and the tendency of groups to not recognise the authority of the chiefs of other
communities, have created a volatile situation in which there is a variety of sometimes
changing chiefs who each control different groups and different parts of the groupe-
ment. Furthermore, chiefs of different communities have relied on armed groups to
reinforce their position, in some cases also to guarantee access to the revenues of
market and other forms of taxation. While many Banyamulenge in Bijombo pre-
viously supported the FRF and now its successor movement headed by ‘colonel’Nya-
musharaba Shaka, the Bafuliiru and Banyindu have maintained ties to different Mai-
Mai groups, such as those of Pandisa, Makuba, and Mahoro. Although these armed
groups only sporadically confront each other directly, they are a crucial part of the
ongoing conﬂicts around territory, identity, and authority in Bijombo, which
provide them with mobilising narratives and support both from leaders in conﬂict
and populations in search of protection. At the same time, the presence of armed
groups has changed the dynamics of these conﬂicts, in part as armed actors also
pursue their own interests and ambitions, and raise the stakes of disputes by creating
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additional grievances. Moreover, their presence entices people to take recourse to
armed actors to solve private disputes and settle scores. Finally, by having many
youths in their ranks, armed groups contribute to altering social identities and
relations, socialising youth into the practice and logic of violence.
Concluding remarks
In January 2011, the FRF ofﬁcially ended its armed struggle and agreed to integrate
into the FARDC. The peace deal that was struck was primarily tuned towards the
needs of the military leadership, promising them high ranks and positions in the
FARDC, and control over a newly created operational sector on the Plateaux. The
realisation of the group’s political demands, including the revival of Minembwe terri-
tory, enhanced political participation at the provincial and national level, and socio-
economic development and the improvement of infrastructure on the Plateaux,
were deferred to future negotiations. To date, the progress made on these demands
has been rather limited, causing disappointment among many of the FRF’s suppor-
ters. One of the reasons has been inﬁghting among the political leadership, more pre-
occupied with realising their personal ambitions than the FRF’s political agenda. This
reﬂects a long-standing problem among the Banyamulenge community: the lack of a
coherent political leadership that can advance its claims and regulate its conﬂicts
through non-violent channels. At present, the most inﬂuential Banyamulenge at the
national and provincial level are found in the security services. The community has
no provincial or national members of parliament, and only one provincial minister.
Thus, military elites continue to take precedence over political leaders, causing politi-
cal participation to remain relatively limited. This is an important reason why the
desire for the resurrection of a separate territory-cum-circumscription on the Plateaux
remains strong among the Banyamulenge, and continues to be seen as a precondition
for their political emancipation and socio-economic development. The pending trans-
formation of the locality of Minembwe into a commune rurale (rural community), a
decentralised territorial entity with an elected council that has considerable
decision-making power over local affairs, will not do much to solve the issue, although
it is generally welcomed as a step forwards. In January 2013, the Minister of the
Interior announced that Minembwe will obtain the statute of commune rurale as
part of the ongoing decentralisation process. Yet, the commune will only cover a rela-
tively small surface around Minembwe, thus being of little beneﬁt to the Banyamu-
lenge living in other parts of the vast Plateaux area. Furthermore, it will not help
improve the Banyamulenge’s electoral chances. For these various reasons, the need
for a separate territory continues to be strongly felt.
Violent entrepreneurs continue to feed off these sentiments, whether advocating for
or contesting the territory. After the FRF disappeared in 2011, none of the Mai-Mai
groups that had claimed for years that the presence of the FRF and its claims for
restoring Minembwe territory were among their main reasons for being in the bush
laid down arms, with the exception of a small fringe of the Mai-Mai Kapopo. This
shows how Minembwe territory served more as a mobilising narrative than a
primary cause of these groups’ armed activities. However, this does not indicate
that conﬂicts surrounding territory, identity, and authority merely serve as a pretext
for opportunistic violent entrepreneurs: because of their identity dimension and con-
nection to memories of past violence, these conﬂicts are deeply felt. Moreover, disputes
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surrounding local authority strongly inﬂuence local governance, and therefore have
considerable effects on people’s everyday lives. This is very palpable in the groupement
of Bijombo, where conﬂicts around territory and authority framed in identity-based
terms continue to be intense. It is therefore no coincidence that the last remaining
Banyamulenge armed group, that of Nyamusharaba, which is formed by ex-FRF dis-
sidents who refused to integrate in 2011, has its primary base of support and oper-
ations in that part of the Plateaux. Yet ultimately, it is not these conﬂicts in
themselves that push people to create and support armed groups: the engine behind
armed group proliferation is a militarised logic that makes appealing to force in
order to strengthen the position of one’s community and oneself seem a justiﬁed
course of action. Armed groups and their supporters therefore also have more parti-
cularistic interests in perpetuating the militarised system that this logic produces.
This again blocks non-violent solutions for conﬂicts around territory, identity, and
authority. In this sense, conﬂicts and violence constitute an almost self-enforcing
cycle of militarisation. However, as territory, identity, and authority are not unchange-
able phenomena, despite the ossifying effects of their reiﬁcation, this cycle can poten-
tially be broken.
Notes
1. While we are aware of the problematic connotations and essentialising effects of the term
‘(ethnic) community’ (Brubaker 2004), we have chosen to still employ this term, as it is a
crucial form of social identiﬁcation and frame of reference within the research context. Fur-
thermore, we explicitly highlight the constructed nature of and internal divisions within
different ‘communities’.
2. Land not controlled by customary chiefs was declared vacant, andwas governed by colonial
regimes of land access based on individual, rather than customary, communitarian
ownership.
3. As Simba rebels testify:
There was ﬁghting in Malanda on 4 July 1966. For the cows of Malanda, we haven’t
found a single one. We went searching among the Wanyarwanda on 23 June 1966, we
have attacked the Rwandans and we have taken 500 cows. (authors’ translation)
(Gérard-Libois and Verhaegen 1967, 399)
4. Phonetically Zaïrois (Zairian), but spelled Zaï-RWA to emphasise Rwandan origins.
5. The various massacres in this era, including the attacks on the refugee camps, are documen-
ted in the UNOHCHR (2010).
6. The direct cause of their mutiny was the order to be redeployed to Kasai and Katanga,
which was experienced as an attempt by the RPA to fragilise Banyamulenge military
capacity (Sages des Banyamulenge 1998).
7. The idea of federalism does not only stem from the speciﬁc situation of the Banyamulenge,
but is informed by a wider political vision on centre-periphery relations and the conﬁgur-
ation of the Congolese state, notably the idea that Kinshasa is too distant and absent in
far-ﬂung areas and the government ‘must be brought closer to the people’.
8. In response to political claims of the Batembo community, the RCD instituted a second ter-
ritory in Bunaykiri, which cut off the Batembo inhabited regions from the Havu dominated
territory of Kalehe.
9. It concerns arrêté départemental No.001/MJ/DAT/MB/ROUTE/1999 d’organisation admin-
istrative portant création à titre provisoire du territoire de Minembwe dans la province du Sud
Kivu
10. The involvement of Banyamulenge troops in the Makobola massacre at the end of Decem-
ber 1998, during which hundreds of civilians were killed by the RCD military, was a direct
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trigger of this confrontation. In the wake of the massacre, the RPA arrested and transferred
a number of Banyamulenge commanders to Goma to restore order. This fostered wide-
spread resentment, as it was seen as an effort to lay the blame on and marginalise Banya-
mulenge troops. What also played a role was a personal conﬂict between RPA commander
Major Gapﬁzi and Munyamulenge commander Paciﬁque Masunzu, who increasingly
opposed RPA dominance.
11. A similar decision was taken in relation to the territory of Bunyakiri, causing fears within
the Batembo community for renewed exclusion.
12. However, in reality, the chef de poste of Minembwe operated largely autonomously from the
Fizi authorities, for example withholding a share of the market tax revenues. Thus, the new
authority set-up essentially perpetuated a long tradition of de facto local self-government
for the Banyamulenge.
13. Interview, representative of Banyamulenge student association, Minembwe, 7 March 2010.
14. Interview, president of Banyamulenge mutualité (self-help/social insurance association),
Uvira, 10 April 2014.
15. Interview Mai-Mai leader William Amuri Yakotumba, Fizi, December 2011.
16. Interview Raphael Looba Undji, Fizi, December 2011.
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